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SSAT Project Objective (from NASA PRG) 
• 
Objectives: The System-Wide Safety and Assurance 
Technologies (SSAT) project will identify risks and 
provide knowledge required to safely manage 
increasing complexity in the design and operation of 
vehicles and the air transportation systems, including 
advanced approaches to enable improved and cost-
effective verification and validation of flight-critical 
systems. 
The Project will address the following challenges: 
• [Develop] verification and validation tools for 
manufacturers and certifiers to use to assure flight 
critical systems are safe in a rigorous and cost- and 
time-effective manner. 
• [Understand and Predict] system-wide safety 
concerns of the airspace system and the vehicles by 
developing technologies that can utilize vehicle and 
system data to accurately identify precursors to 
potential incidents or accidents. 
• [Understand] the key parameters of human 
performance which provide the human contribution 
to safety in aviation. 
• [Predict] the [remaining useful] life of complex 
systems by reasoning under uncertainty about root 
causes (diagnosis) and predict faults and remaining 
useful life (prognosis) across multiple systems. 
• 
NASA 
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 
FY 2012 Planning, Progranuning, 
Budgeting and Execution Process 
Program and Resources Guidance 
May 6, 2010 
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Project Reorganization 
• 
IVHM Project 
(2007 - 2010) 
Aviation Safety Program 
Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project 
Df.A.noll s.rtw •• tIi"'ll. PrinC.". IfI""lIga.f 
Dr. RobHt Ml1II, PrafK1 sdutist 
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Aviation Safety Program 
• Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project 
Dr. Ashok Srivastava, Principal Investigator 
Dr. Robert Mah, Project Scientist 
Robert Kerczewski, Acting Project Manager 
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IVHM Project Goals 
• 
"Develop technologies to reduce accidents and incidents by 
developing vehicle health management systems to determine the 
state of degradation for aircraft subsystems; developing and 
demonstrating tools and techniques to mitigate in-flight damage, 
degradation, and failures" 
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IVHM Research Framework 
• Level 4 - Aircraft Level 
Goal -- Validated multidisciplinary integrated vehicle health management tools 
and techniques to enable automated detection, diagnosis, prognosis and mitigation of 
IVHM 4.1 Vehicle-Level adverse events during flight. 
Reasoning and Groundl 
Fli ht Test Evaluations 
Level 3 - Themes 
IVHM 3.1 
Detection 
Level 2 -
Subsystems 
IVHM 4.2 Systems 
Analysis 
IVHM 3.2 
Diagnosis 
IVHM 2.1 Aircraft 
Systems HM 
IVHM 2.2 
Airframe HM 
Level 1 -
Foundational 
IVHM 3.3 
Prognosis 
IVH M 1.1 Advanced 
Sensors IVHM 1.2 Modeling 
and Materials 
IVHM 4.3 
Dashlink 
IVHM 3.4 
Mitigation 
IVH M 4.4 Research 
Test and Integration 
IVHM 3.5 
Integrity Assurance 
IVHM 2.3 
Propulsion HM 
IVHM 2.4 
Software HM 
IVHM 1.3 Advanced 
Analytics and 
Complex Systems 
IVHM 1.4 Verification 
and Validation 
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IVHM Major milestones (5 year plan) 
• 
Technology Level/Fiscal Year 08 09 10 11 12 
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Accum. Framework sm Malfuncl Classification 
User Requirement Document ~ ~igh-Temp Power O OPli cal. 
Physics-Based Models Demo. <X> • Demo. . 0 (') Isoklnetic HM Nano. Sensors Demo 
Advanced Analytics and Complex Syste ms 
Verification and Validation 
Key: Level 4 .A. Recurring .:.. 
Compositi onal 
Veri fi cation Demo 
DetectionO Diagnosis. PrognosisO Mitigation . Integrity Assurance o 8 
IVHM NRA Partners 
• 
• Our Portfolio 
• 
On-board system failures and faults - 3 active 
Detection -- 6 active and 1 completed in FY10 
Diagnosis -- 7 active and 1 completed in FY10 
Prognosis -- 6 active and 1 completed in FY10 
Mitigation -- 2 active 
Integrity Assurance -- 5 active 
Ongoing monitoring of operational data -- 3 active 
Tracking Progress 
STA N FORD 
lIN I \, I II. ~ 'T Y 
All reviews are conducted annually at the Project Level: PI, PM, PS, API, COTRITM + other interested 
parties 
Reviews are conducted via WebEx 
Review comments are formally collected and forwarded to awardee via COTRITM 
Many face-to-face interactions occur annually at both NASA and awardee sites 
All NRA documentation is stored on NX so that the entire project team has access 
• NRA Value to IVHM 
Overall the performance of the NRA awards were judged VERY GOOD. 
Each award is mapped to one or more approved IVHM Technical Plan milestones. 
Mitek1fP' 
systems 
Colier ReseCllrcih Corpora'tion ~." 
-OLD 
I]?MI N ION 
UNIVERSITY OAI o eywell 
A . 
U IVERSITY 
OF Mr ESOTA 
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• 
Validated, proactive solutions for ensuring 
SSAT Project Goals 
• 
• "Understanding and predicting system-wide safety concerns of the airspace system ... and 
the vehicles as envisioned by NextGen, including the emergent effects of increased use 
of automation to enhance system efficiency and performance beyond current, human 
based systems, through health monitoring of system-wide functions that are 
integrated across distributed ground, air, and space systems .... 
• Develop fundamentally new data mining algorithms to support automated data analysis 
tools to integrate ... from a diverse array of data resources" 
• "Research to improve confidence and timeliness of certification ... " 
• "Develop improved system engineering processes and tools for determining optimum 
roles of humans and automation in complex systems ... " 
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SSAT Research Framework 
• Level 2 - Project Level 
Goal- Develop validated multidisciplinary tools and techniques to ensure system safety in 
NextGen to enable proactive management of safety risk through predictive methods. 
SSAT 2.1 Technical 
Challenges 
Level 3 - Subproject 
SSAT 3.1 
Verification & 
Validation of Flight Critical 
Systems (VVFCS) 
SSAT 2.2 Systems 
Analysis (SA) 
SSAT 3.2 
Data Mining and 
Knowledge 
Discovery (DMKD) 
Level 4 - Subproject Elements 
• SSAT 4.1.1: Argument-
Based Safety 
Assurance 
• SSAT 4.1.2: Authority 
and Autonomy 
• SSAT 4.1.3: Distributed 
Systems 
• SSAT 4.1.4: Software 
Intensive Systems 
P-----------------~ 
• SSAT 4.2.1: System-
Level Reasoning 
• SSAT 4.2.2: Anomaly 
Detection from 
Massive Data Streams 
• SSAT 4.2.3: Discovery 
of Causal Factors 
• SSAT 4.2.4: Prediction 
of Adverse Events 
SSAT 2.3 Partnerships 
and Outreach 
SSAT 3.3 
Human Systems 
Solutions (HSS) 
• SSAT 4.3.1: Human 
Automation Tools 
• SSAT 4.3.2: 
Operational 
Complexity Metrics 
and Methods 
• SSAT 4.3.3: Human 
Performance 
Mechanisms 
"Validated, proactive solutions for ensuring safety in flight and operations" 
SSAT 2.4 Research J 
Test & Integration (RTII 
SSAT 3.4 
Prognostics and 
Decision Making 
(PDM) 
• SSAT 4.4.1: Decision 
Making under 
Uncertainty 
• SSAT 4.4.2: 
Diagnostics 
• SSAT 4.4.3: 
Prognostics 
• SSAT 4.4.4: Software 
Health Management 
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SSAT Project Technical Challenges 
• 1. Assurance of Flight Critical Systems (FV25) 
Development of safe, rapid, and cost 
effective NextGen Systems using a 
unified safety assurance process for 
ground based and airborne systems. 
2. Discovery of Safety Incidents (FV19) 
Automated discovery of previously 
unknown precursors to aviation 
safety incidents in massive (>10 TB) 
heterogeneous data sets. 
We..-ther A.=loslmU .... 
into- Oeclalon...Maldng 
~, --......Jjl 
- .......... 
....... _-
{:;a:: F Uphl Op:r .. Oon'l: iII:fl d .5Lrpport , Bt otl.d '-A,.. 
3. Automation Design Tools (FV20) 
Increase safety of human -
automation interaction by 
incorporating human performance 
considerations throughout the design 
lifecycle in NextGen technologies. 
4. Prognostic Algorithm Design for 
Safety Assurance (FV25): 
Development of verifiable 
prognostic algorithms to help 
remove obstacles to certification. 
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Technical Challenge 1 
Assurance of Flight Critical Systems 
Safe and Rapid Deployment of NextGen 200.00 
Fill a critical gap in the life-cycle 175.00 
I. 
development of complex systems for 0 
I. 
NextGen by developing time- and cost- ~ 150.00 
effective techniques for verification and ,~ 
validation of complex civil aviation systems ~ 125.00 
that will unify processes for ground based : 
I!J 100.00 
and airborne systems (FY25). 0 
o 
Benefits: 
• Rapid but safe incorporation of 
technological advances in avionics, 
software, automation, and aircraft and 
airspace concepts of operation. 
G> 75.00 
> 
25.00 
0.00 r::::::::::::I I" r""l I" n I 
Requirements Design Code 
• 
-
T T 
Development Acceptance Operation 
Test Test 
• Availability of safety assurance methods 
for confident and reliable certification, 
enabling manufacturers and users to 
exploit latest technological advances and 
operational concepts. 
Phase in which error was detected and corrected 
I Boeing 787 software cost "'$4.5B I 14 
I 
Technical Challenge 2 
Discovery of Safety Incidents 
• Automated discovery of previously unknown 
precursors to aviation safety incidents (FV19). 
A first-of-a-kind demonstration of the 
automated discovery of precursors to aviation 
safety incidents through analysis of massive 
heterogeneous data sets. 
Benefits: 
• Understanding the impact of degradations in 
human performance on aircraft performance. 
• Identifying fleet-wide anomalies due to 
mechanical and other related issues that can 
impact safety, maintenance schedules, and 
operating cost. 
• Development of advanced methods to 
predict adverse events due to introduction of 
new technologies in NextGen. 
Sample Text Report 
JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN, 
LAX TWR TOLD US TO GO 
AROUND BECAUSE OF THE 
ACFT IN FRONT OF US .... 
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Example Applications on ISS 
~:.~ ---~ 
~,---. 
Autom,atic,ally learns how t , e ,sys.' em W1pically '- a,Ve5 
,and teUs you if it is behav~mg dilffelre I tly 1 0 
• Control Moment Gyros 
• RGA 
• ETCS 
• ARJ 
• Beta Gimbal Unit 
• CORA 
• 
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ISS Early External Thermal Control System 
• 
155 Ea rly )(t, r al Th, r al Con ral VS nr (EETeS), 
• EETCS used to di~sipatle . a on-'bord ISS 
'. H ~at 'tra . Sf,@ r@ t iC I quid 81 me la (;00111'1\8: . ops. 
ili A · mo nia cirtiJ I au!! - to ltlxt@al ra iato rs to coe I 
'. n rly J nu rry 2007 . CS d Vi lop n 
rnmoni ,gas bubble 
• Bubbl e n.o ,ed by IS.S 00 toll e .>' -91 • 0 rs <efcr e 
i 'bu sf and! diisrp:ated back i . 0 Ii Qui" 
Results: ISS Earlfy Exte rna 'I Thermal Controll System 
u 
u f'y 6 days, prior to 
detecfonv~a standard ~1D 
l' tech niqlu es 
.;:: B 
~ 
• I S tJi'alned (I 1&5 days 01 d t 
ill 2:3 para m@nars analyzed(pre"ll 'I m ' U.I 1 qu nl j pump sp d~ 1 
iii Z-sc-ore no mallzatlon., IlO ,ext . 1'1 I C() gu ' t l on~/cI ' rill cI . , m ~ .7 
Example Application on STS 
• 
• Data ve!:tOrs fo-rmed om 4 
tempI! ra iJ re $I!tn~orn 
Inil<:le lhe wins I Ml(; OL liM Wh 
.. D"~ oolltred fir~ ,8 rninut~ 
o each fhibt Illul'ld1 ' 01 
Main Enli:ineCu 0 I 
• T~ I " 'ed on tel'eme:tered dii!~ 
from 10 p r,e",ious 
Columbia , ig ts; 
NO'fma lizatiQn: 
.. Di!ltaI I!-precSS@-11 i!I!s,l,li!l lue 
rtelet 'Ie to a reference senwr ... 
IMLG Outboord 'Wheeol Temp) 
to, ao:;c>ount fa r wide a rnb-ent 
'tlimJ)1 rIIt u r,. IJI rla:tlo 1'1': in 
. i3 i n i ni data 
STS-107' Laun1ch IIMIS Analy.sis 
---------------- - ---------~ ~ 
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Example Application on STS 
• 
5 ace Sl'1uttlle Wing lLe8Jd~ng Edg,e' Impact 
D@ @·ctilon Syste.'m {WLIEIDS) 
3021-0 ~eleIfQme'l' rs 
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KHz .emOF daa 
on~ o.n orb .• S«1cSOf d-at,a 
su ' ry file h:a nsm i i eo 
w rs sioo Control fur 
I . $ 
60 
!;O 
~o 
:10 
2Q 
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a ~ 
I 
20 
3ra 
40 
DET Is) 
Po ints of Interest 
Detected by 0 rcall MS 
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Technical Challenge 3 
Automation Design Tools 
• 
Advancing Safety by Understanding 
Human Performance i ~ -~.s t ~~.T~~S 
RECEJYER 
Develop analysis tools that incorporate 
known limitations of human performance 
and enable design of robust human-
automation systems to increase safety 
and reduce validation costs in NextGen 
(FY 20). 
Benefits: 
-Methods and tools appropriate for 
designers, trainers, and operators. 
-Enable the prediction of human 
performance to identify, evaluate, and 
resolve safety issues due to Human -
Automation interaction. 
Graphic DisplayS 
itlSTANr 
HEARTRIJE 
IiS'l'ANr 
IEIPlllA110M 
RATE 
Iilll:AHTSICN 
18II'ERATUAf' 
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Technical Challenge 4 
Prognostic Algorithms for Safety Assurance 
• 
Prognostic Algorithm Design for Safety 
Assurance 
Development of a new class of 
verifiable prognostic algorithms to 
help remove obstacles to the 
certification of prognostic algorithms 
(FY25). 
Benefits: . 
• New class of verifiable systems 
health management algorithms and 
methods. 
• Lowered barrier to deployment of 
systems health management 
algorithms. 
20 
~ 
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> 
Edge 540T Flight Test bed 
Particle Filter est imate 
Rea l data 
I 
BHM hardware & 
Real time CPU 
Real time particle filter 
for battery RUL prognosis. 
EKpected times of 
reaching thre shold 
(darker lines denote 
late r pred ictions) 
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SSAT Project Organizational Structure 
Technical 
Challenges 
• 
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SSAT Partnership Strategy 
• SSAT develops partners based on a strategic need (as assessed by the Project Management Team) in 
the following areas: 
• Access to data not readily available to NASA that is directly related to a Tech Challenge 
• Experimental platforms and unique expertise directly related to a Tech Challenge 
• Unique test, integration, and infusion opportunities 
We are frequently approached for potential partnerships from domestic and international 
government agencies, academic institutions, air carriers, and major industry players. 
easyJet 
~IIIIE'AlD' SSAT ~ GOODRICH 
MAKEL VSST ~J=~,' 
ENGINEERING 
O ~.!!h~W AEST •• ~T. 
'~ 
SSAT RTI Partnerships and Outreach 
Validation of data mining algorithms for discovering 
precursors to aviation safety incidents. 
Research Test and Integration Collaborations 
• Partial list of partners supporting collaborative research 
• Prognostic algorithms for EMA; integrated research on 
Engine Fault Detection and Diagnosis 
• V&V and Software Health Management 
• Pilot fatigue (SOFIA, Air Force) 
• Support research in Airspace Concepts 
24 
Overview- SSAT Partnerships (II) 
• 
VSST / AEST 
Assessment of current Systems Health Management capabilities and 
emerging technologies for V&V, Data Mining, Human Automation 
and Interaction Tools, and Prognostics/Decision Making; 
development of an analytical framework for evaluation and 
benchmarking of these technologies; and collaboration in health 
management data and algorithms. 
• System architecture to enable resilient flight deck automation 
technologies based on the output of the Vehicle Level Reasoning 
System. 
• Vehicle level detection and diagnosis of sensor and actuator faults; 
application of virtual sensor technology; system architecture to 
enable resilient adaptive control based on the output of the Vehicle 
Level Reasoning System. 
• Vehicle-level architecture and reasoner 
• Ground to flight architectures and testbeds 
·IVHM-enabled CBM 
• Data Mining 
25 
Overview - SSAT Partnerships (III) 
• 
easyJet ONERA 
~ The Joint Planning and Development Office 
Making NextGen a Reality 
A Federal Aviation 
• Admin istration 
Airspace Systems Program 
Networking and Information 
Technology Research and 
Oevelopment Source (NITRO) 
Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT) 
Validation of methods to discover precursors to aviation 
safety incidents and the impact of pilot fatigue. 
Cooperative research and technology development 
(R& TO) activities in the areas of V&V, data mining, and 
human automation and interaction tool technologies and 
systems. 
Prognostics of composites. (SAA) 
Co-funding CMU NRA for demonstrating compositional 
verification on separation assurance software 
Participation/representation for three NITRO Program 
Coordination Areas: High Confidence Software and 
Systems; Software Design & Productivity Human 
Computer Interaction & Information Management 
Year long collaboration and membership regarding the use 
of data mining to discover precursors to safety incidents 
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Assurance of Flight Critical 
Systems (including 
Software Health 
Management) 
Discovery of Safety Issues 
Automation Design Tools 
Prognostic Algorithm 
Design for Safety 
Assurance 
SSAT Research Partners 
• 
MICHIGAN 
Kestrel 
Technology 
• 
1 
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Progress Metrics for SSAT Research 
A Model-Based Approach 
• SSAT used a model-based approach to assess the impact of our research and progress 
toward meeting our Te. Uncertainty of progress metric increases with time. 
• The assumptions have been validated with the Technical Leads and DPMFs. 
• These metrics give only one assessment of the progress towards solution of the challenge. 
There are other ways to demonstrate the progress and impact of our research. 
• Models incorporate an assessment of probability of technical infusion, thus helping to 
address progress towards completion of Te. 
• About the Models 
Model parameters can be changed based on new information and can be used to perform 'what-if 
analysis', such as, 'what if our research produces a 20% improvement in accuracy instead of a 10% 
improvement?' . 
- The models include factors that are 'hard-benefits' such as improvements in accuracy, speed, etc., 
and 'soft-benefits' such as 'improvement in query technologies'. 
- The models include a parameter that assess the likelihood of technology transition into a real-
world implementation (not just transition from NASA to industry). 
- The models are tied to overarching safety goals with specific Aviation Safety incidents and 
accidents cited using an approach similar to that used in the IT industry. 
• SSAT will update these models routinely to maintain relevance to Tech Challenges and 
changing research results and needs. 
All models are wrong, but some are useful- G. E. P. Box 
28 
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Measuring Progress 
Assurance of Flight Critical Systems 
FY 11 
FY12Q2 Static code 
techniques for 
certification 
FY 12 FY 13 
FY12Q4 Analytical 
framework for 
mitigation strategies 
FY 14 
FY14Q3 Compositional 
reasoning as verification 
techniques 
FY 15 FY 16 - 30 
FY14Q3 Formal models for 
analyzing human/ 
automation roles and 
responsi bi lities 
FY15Q3 Prototype of integrated tool for Resilience 
Engineering Integrated, Distributed Systems 
FY13Ql Use of formal 
methods as evidence for 
safety cases 
FY15Q4 Advance safety assurance to enable deployment 
of NextGen Flight Critical Systems 
What are the intermediate and final exams to check for success? 
• Demonstration of a 0% false positive rate by combining static analysis and model checking 
• Development of validated communication topologies 
• Unified approach to autonomy and authority 
30 
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Measuring Progress 
_-======D=i=sc=o=v=e=r't of Safety Issues 
FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 
FYIIQ4 Scalable algorithm 
for anomaly detection on 
heterogeneous data 
FY12Q4 Scalable algorithm for 
prediction of prescribed 
adverse events in discrete 
and continuous data 
FY13Q2 Vehicle Level Reasoning 
FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 - 30 
FY15Q4 Automated 
discovery of precursors to 
safety incidents 
FY14Q4 Identification of 
precursors in flight and text data 
What are the intermediate and final exams to check for success? 
• Development of methods to analyze 10 TB of heterogeneous data 
• Development of methods to identify crew performance degradation 
• Development of predictive methods for heterogeneous data sets. 
32 
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FY 11 
Measuring Progress 
Automation Design Tools 
FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 - 30 
FY12Q4 Methods for 
determining human functional 
state in operations 
FY15Q4 Identification of novel Human 
- Automation Interaction failures, 
Human Automation Design Tools 
FY14Q4 Predictive Human 
Performance Design Tools 
What are the intermediate and final exams to check for success? 
• Proof-of-concept tools demonstrating the ability to support the design validation and verification 
process; Framework reviewed by subject matter experts. 
• Proof-of-concept Matlab based visualization tool suite for monotonic analog signals arising from 
sensor and performance based aircraft operations or faults. 
Aviation Safety Program Annual Review November 16-17, 2011 I SSAT Project 34 
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Measuring Progress 
Pro nostics Algorithms for Safety Assurance 
FY 11 FY 12 
FYIIQ4 Performance baseline 
for prognostic algorithms 
FY 13 FY 14 
FY13Ql Safety assurance 
performance metrics for 
prognostic algorithms 
FY 15 FY 16 - 30 
FY15Q4 Demonstrate verifiable 
prognostics on flight vehicle 
SSAT.1.1.PDM.3.0S 
Prognostics Demonstration 
What are the intermediate and final exams to check for success? 
• Demonstrate the prognostics algorithm meets the verifiability metric previously identified, 
and demonstrate using a flight vehicle that the previously identified performance metric is met. 
• Provide metrics, methods, and tools to VSST for integration. 
• Investigate diagnostic and/or prognostic algorithm with respect to: (1) verifiability; (2) ability to 
distill varying degrees of knowledge of underlying physics; (3) ability to process varying degrees 
of knowledge about uncertainty 
Aviation Safety Program Annual Review November 16-17,2011 I SSAT Project 36 
SSAT Project Technical Challenges 
Annual Performance Goal (APG) 
EXAMPLE (FYll/FY12) 
Data Mining - Scalable anomaly detection on heterogeneous data 
• Description: Development of a scalable algorithm for anomaly 
detection on data consisting of discrete and continuous sequences 
as well as text reports that have been matched up (Le., are from the 
same flight). 
• Metric/Exit Criteria: Algorithm that identifies at least three 
anomalies (in real flight data) validated by an expert to be statistical 
anomalies. Run time should be nominally no more than 50% 
greater than the run time for the fastest algorithm that runs on only 
discrete and continuous sequences. 
37 
Mining Heterogeneous Data is the Key 
Primary Source: Aircraft 
Can answer what happened in 
during an Aviation Safety 
Incident 
Primary Source: Radar data 
Can answer what happened in 
the National Airspace during 
Aviation Safety Incident (in 
preparation) 
Primary Source: Humans 
Can answer why 
an Aviation Safety Incident 
happened 
Sample Text 
Report 
JUST PRIOR TO 
TOUCHDOWN, 
LAX TWR TOLD 
US TO GO 
AROUND 
BECAUSE OF 
THE ACFT IN 
FRONT OF US. 
38 
Knowledge Dissemination 
• 
Conferences 
Journal Articles 
NASA Technical Manuscripts 
Book Chapters & Contractor Reports 
Books 
DASHlink Downloads (Papers, Code, 
and Data) 
44 
4 
16 
2 
Approximately 3000 
downloads per month 
8 Awards at Major International 
Conferences: 
• IEEE International Conference on 
Data Mining 
• IEEE International Conference on 
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 
• Prognostics and 
Health Management Society 
• Surface Mount 
Technology Association 
• Autotestcon 
J~~ D;4Stllink~ I ........:J 
A web-based collaboration tool for those 
interested in data mining and systems 
health 
LEARN MORE 
Research Areas 
Learn about Ollr research 
fields, goals and their 
associated projects. 
Projects Resources 
See what others in the Available data sets, 
community are working algorithms, and 
on. Join or start your own_ publications FREE to 
download 
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Impact of the SSAT Project • 
40 
• 
THANK YOU 
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